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                "title": "Response to Comment by Mr Bill Alp",
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                        "*": "by '''Chris S. M. Turney'''\n\nSchool of Biological, Earth and Environmental Sciences (BEES), University of New South Wales (UNSW), Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia.\n\n\n\n\nMr Alp has written a curious comment on the article entitled \u2018Why didn\u2019t they ask Evans?\u2019 [15]. Mr Alp has two primary concerns: \n\n* 1. Did Lieutenant Edward \u2018Teddy\u2019 Evans, second-in-command to Captain Scott on the British Antarctic Expedition (BAE) 1911-1913, contribute to a shortage of food for the returning Polar Party?; and \n\n* 2. Did Lieutenant Evans fail to pass on Scott\u2019s orders regarding meeting the dog team at the southern end of the Ross Ice Shelf?\n\nHe also expresses concerns over the quality of the reports on this study by some media outlets. I will address these concerns but inevitably with what is now a substantive body of research, I cannot cover all aspects and ask readers to return to previous publications where more details can be found [14-16].\n\nMr Alp considers that the events surrounding the BAE should be a \u201cstraightforward assembly and presentation of verifiable facts\u201d. But if there is one thing we do know from a century of research into the BAE on and off the ice, there are a mass of contradictory actions and statements. One of the aims of my article was to bring together previously unpublished sources and new analyses of material to explore these contradictions to better understand what led to the fatal events surrounding the return of Captain Scott\u2019s Polar Party [15].\n\nMr Alp highlights concern about the reliability of reporting in The Daily Mail. The fact that he identifies this newspaper as a sensational source of news is now increasingly recognized. Researchers should and must communicate their findings to the public. With the worrying decline in the number of science-trained journalists on the staff of news outlets, however, one can often only hope that the accompanying reports will be accurate and without sensation.  Sadly, this is not always the case. I will not list headlines of questionable quality produced by The Daily Mail during the same year of publication (2017) but for illustrative purposes, Microsoft\u2019s Edge browser recently warned online readers of this media outlet to: \u201cProceed with caution: this website generally fails to maintain basic standards of accuracy and accountability.\u201d A report on this warning can be found at [https://www.theguardian.com/media/2019/jan/23/dont-trust-daily-mail-website-microsoft-browser-warns-users]. I completely agree with Mr Alps concerns regarding this particular media outlet. \n\nI will now address the two primary concerns raised by Mr Alp.\n\nIn an ideal world one would have eye-witness account of the events in question but as I trust Mr Alp appreciate, this is not always possible. Widows Kathleen Scott and Oriana Wilson both received the diaries and other documents written by their husbands. Their contents were clearly of sufficient concern to warrant individual meetings with Lord Curzon, President of the Royal Geographical Society (RGS). In these meetings, Lord Curzon learnt that \u201cIt appears Lieut Evans \u2013 down with scurvy \u2013 and the two men with him must on return journey have entered & consumed more than their share\u201d and subsequently \u201cMrs Wilson told me later there was a passage in her husband\u2019s diary which spoke of the \u201cinexplicable\u201d shortage of fuel & pemmican on the return journey, relating to depots which had not been touched by Meares and which could only refer to an unauthorised subtraction by one or other of the returning parties. This passage however she proposes to show to no one and to keep secret\u201d [4].\n\nThe above claims were of sufficient concern to Lord Curzon to establish a \u201cConfidential Committee\u201d. Admiral Beaumont, Fellow of the RGS, wrote in response to an invitation from Curzon to join the Committee that: \u201c\u2026.the important point, to my mind, being the necessity of deciding what attitude the Society should take with regard to your questions (a) & (b) that is:- the exhaustion of the supplies of food & fuel \u2013 and the conduct of the relief parties\u201d [1]. As I state in the original article, there were clear concerns back in the UK over the events on the ice, both regarding supplies and the nature of the orders given to dog-team.Mr Alp might consider Kathleen Scott, Oriana Wilson, Lord Curzon, Admiral Beaumont, and others, to have simply \u2018fussed\u2019 over the missing food and orders, but these concerns clearly refer to documents not currently in the public domain and perhaps no longer in existence. The original sledging diary kept by Lieutenant Evans would be an ideal source to test these claims but as I state in the original article, this is now sadly lost (J. Evans, pers. comm). No one is suggesting that \u201cLord Curzon, K Scott, O Wilson and Markham\u201d could possibly \u201chave witnessed Evans alleged transgressions in Antarctica\u201d as stated by Mr Alp, but to ignore these sources is poor scholarship.\n\nThe science of human nutrition was its infancy at the start of the twentieth century, and it is now widely accepted that the polar team\u2019s rations contained insufficient calories to sustain them on their venture [13]. But there now seems little doubt that Lieutenant Evans failed to follow dietary instructions on the expedition, arguably the most important of which was the consumption of seal meat, a vital source of Vitamin C that helped prevent scurvy. Some years after the BAE, scientist and expeditioner Frank Debenham remarked in a newspaper interview: \u201cWe did know that seal meat was a preventative, and only one member of our expedition got scurvy in severe form: Teddy Evans... Teddy really was a very naughty boy and wouldn\u2019t eat his seal meat. It\u2019s not fishy, but it is black, and tastes like very poor steak, and the rest of us ate it\u201d (Sydney Morning Herald, 27 January 1959, 2). During newspaper interviews on his return from the Antarctic, Evans himself claimed to have \u201csubsisted all that time on a diet consisting almost wholly of pemmican\u201d (The Advertiser, 18 May 1912, Adelaide: 20), something that contains virtually no Vitamin C. The practical upshot was Evans succumbed to scurvy, jeopardising his life and as I detail in the article, those on the expedition. \n\nMr Alp raises concerns over the orders for the dogs. I am afraid I did not see his email regarding Norwegian ski expert Tryggve Gran\u2019s text on the orders for the dog team; unfortunately, with today\u2019s large volume of spam mail and a heavy teaching term, I did not see his message had been caught by my email filter. Mr Alp raises questions over the interpretation of Norwegian ski expert Tryggve Gran\u2019s description of events. Gran referred to Scott\u2019s orders to Evans regarding the dog team numerous times, both in (Norwegian) print and during interviews (R. Huntford, pers. comm.). In Gran\u2019s 1961 book Kampen Om Sydpolen, Mr Alp is correct that the Norwegian does not explicit describe Scott telling Evans he should send the dogs back across the Ross Ice Shelf during his final meeting with the second-in-command (p. 159) [6]. But Mr Alp is quite incorrect that my interpretation is \u201cnot supported by any text in Gran\u2019s book.\u201dThere are in fact several statements by Gran that make clear Scott gave orders for the dog teams.These include how at the base of the Beardmore Glacier, Scott remarks to expeditioner Cecil Meares that that the \u2018Dogs should meet me. Time and place for this I shall notify through the returning Support Party [to be led by Evans]\u2019 (p. 156), that on the 18 February with their descent to the base of the Beardmore Glacier, Scott expected \u201cthat they would soon meet Meares and the dogs\u201d (p. 175), that the \u201cTime of the meeting of the dogs and Scott \u2026was to be determined when the last Support Party [led by Evans] had returned\u201d (p. 184), and shortly after: \u201cSo if the mission with the dogs should have gone to 82\u00b0 or 83\u00b0 S, either Charles Wright or the biologist Nelson would have been required\u201d (p. 185). Based on these statements, I do not consider it an unreasonable interpretation that the orders were provided to Evans on the Polar Plateau. Indeed, it is hard to not to make any other interpretation. Further support for this claim can be found, for example, in Gran\u2019s 1974 book ''Fra TjuaguttTilSydpolfar''. [7] Here the Norwegian describes that after talking to Evans on board the Terra Nova shortly before the second-in-command\u2019s medical return to the UK, he learnt \u2018After the Beardmore Glacier, the dogs were to be available [to Scott]\u2019 [7].\nGiven the tone of his comment, I am surprised Mr Alp has not interrogated Kampen Om Sydpolenmore fully. It is further disappointing he questions whether this interpretation \u201chas been manipulated, perhaps in order to create a headline-grabbing article.\u201d Some might consider such a statement rather surprising given Mr Alp\u2019s own selective translation. \n\nAs Cherry-Garrard write to medic Lieutenant Atkinson on the 3 April 1913 (shortly after the events on the ice): \u201cI think the main cause of difficulty is that is generally supposed that we returned from One Ton [Dep\u00f4t] with the knowledge that the Southern Party was in trouble (I believe many think we were sent south because they were overdue). Of course, this was not so: the temperatures were low from (from memory) about March 4. But when we returned on March 10 there was no reason to suppose the Polar Party was not close to One Ton with plenty of food: in other words, there was no reason to kill dogs and push on. We were not to risk the dogs. We came back thinking we had started out too early.\u201d Cherry was under no allusion he should attempt to travel across the full extent of the Ross Ice Shelf. But clearly, the orders were issued. \n\nEvans himself later declared he expected the dogs to meet the returning Polar Party when he wrote in a tribute to Oates that \u2018the last farewell was most touching, Oates being far more affected than any other of the Southern Party\u2026He asked me to send him out tobacco and sweets by the dog teams\u2019 (Evans, 1913, The Strand Magazine). Crucially here the order was not acted on. Atkinson remained convinced the order not to risk the dogs was paramount. As a result, on the 26 February, Atkinson sent Cherry-Garrard sledging south with Russian dog driver Demetri Gerof and the dogs, 24 days of supplies, and two weeks provisions to replenish One Ton Depot. Someone, however, was given orders because they were known back in the UK. As I reported for the first time, when news of Scott\u2019s death reached the world on the 12 February 1913, Sir Clements Markham, former President of the RGS and supporter of Scott, wrote to Lord Curzon: \u2018I have just received telegrams with appalling news that Captain Scott and his South Pole party have perished\u2026All the arrangements for depots and supporting sledges were excellent, as Scott\u2019s arrangements always were. Mr Cherry-Garrard (a young volunteer who gave \u00a31000 to the expedition) was to meet the South Pole party, with two teams of dogs, at the foot of the [Beardmore] glacier. As the date, Jan 18, of reaching the Pole was known, the journals must have been recovered. So I think that Cherry-Garrard, when the party never arrived, must have gone up in search\u2019 [9]. The orders were known in the UK but don't appear to have been acted upon.\n\n[[File:Turney.png|thumb|centre|800px|Figure 1.| Figure: Route taken by Lieutenant Evans\u2019 (solid line) and Captain Scott\u2019s (dashed line) parties on their return from the Antarctic Plateau, with Apsley Cherry-Garrard and Demetri Geof's dog sledge journey to One Ton Depot (short dashed line). Summary text with the reported location where penned from Scott\u2019s Diary (SD) [11] and letter to Joseph Kinsey (SL) [10], The Worst Journey in the World (WJW) [3] and William Lashly\u2019s Diary (LD) [5]. Text from Scott\u2019s Diary not reported in the published version given in bold [11]. Key discrepancies in the text during the return of Lieutenant Evans\u2019 Last Supporting Party identified by comparing published [3] and original diary entries by Lashly [5] are underlined. Italicized descriptions of Evans\u2019 condition taken from the published diaries [11] and meteorological observations [12].\u00a9 Chris S. M. Turney]]\n\nAs I state in the original article \u201cIf the order for the dogs to cross the Ross Ice Shelf had been clearly passed on, there would have been some attempt to travel beyond One Ton Depot (albeit restricted because of the limited amount of dog food), but this was not considered a priority at the time\u201d [15]. Certainly, more work could be undertaken by researchers to explore how far the dogs could have traveled with the available supplies but the key point here is that if the orders had been relayed, then a more extended journey with support for the dog team would have been given a greater priority. Evans appears to have actively downplayed any concern, perhaps because he was recovering from scurvy, refusing Gran\u2019s appeal for a relief party to travel to the base of the Beardmore Glacier as detailed in the Norwegian\u2019s edited diary [8]. \n\nMr Alp claims [15] is \u201csilent on when the dogs should meet up with the Polar Party.\u201d Apparently, the published research \u201cwould have had more substance if it included some rigour around the timeline envisaged by Scott.\u201d The full article was a substantial body of work (in excess of 9000 words) so to best present the timeline and geographical location of events, I produced a map summarising key diary entries, dates and their location in the Antarctic (reproduced here). This figure clearly shows where Scott expected to meet the dogs (at the southern end of the Ross Ice Shelf), references to the shortage of food, and the timeline showing when and where Evans fell down and suffered from scurvy. This figure clearly shows the latter has been systematically shifted by one week when comparing the eye-witness account of Bill Lashly (reported in Under Scott\u2019s Command) and that reproduced by Cherry-Garrard in The Worst Journey in the World [3, 5]. An excellent illustration of this is Lashly\u2019s reference to Evans suffering from stiffness in the back of the knee (marking the onset of scurvy) on the 30 January but recorded in Cherry\u2019s version as occurring on the 22 January. I ask the readers to inspect the figure reproduced here and judge for themselves. The timeline for when Evans fell ill has clearly been altered and the question has to be asked why? \n\nImportantly, there were at least two instances of food shortages on the return journey of the Polar Party. The first took place when the men found a full day\u2019s biscuit allowance missing from the Upper Glacier Depot on 7 February 1912 [11, 17]. As I describe in the article, when the Polar Party reached the Southern Barrier Dep\u00f4t on the 24 February, neither Scott or Wilson directly commented at the time on a shortage of food. Indeed, Scott wrote almost reassuringly: \u2018Found store in order except shortage oil - shall have to be very saving with fuel - otherwise, have ten full days\u2019 provision from tonight and shall have less than 70 miles to go.\u2019 It is not unreasonable to assume the recent death of Petty Officer (P.O.) Evans and the loss from leaking fuel were more immediate concerns. But thanks to Bower\u2019s meticulous planning [2], Scott and his team expected to find one week\u2019s rations for five men, equivalent to 35 days\u2019 food for a single person. With the death of P.O. Evans towards the base of the Beardmore Glacier, only four men remained, and with the one day\u2019s worth of rations remaining from the Lower Glacier Depot, there should have been sufficient food for a total of nearly ten days. \n\nBut three days later, Scott had realized there was a shortfall and was hoping his orders for the dogs had been acted upon which he states quite explicitly in his published diary: \u2018We must open out on food soon\u2026.We talk of little but food, except after meals...We are naturally always discussing the possibility of meeting dogs, where and when, etc. It is a critical position...31 miles to the depot, 3 days\u2019 fuel at a pinch and 6 days food [this should be seven days]. Things begin to look a little different; we can open out a little food from tomorrow night\u2026\u2019 Even with the loss of P.O. Evans, they were short of a day\u2019s full rations compared to the more bullish entry on the 24 February. While Mr Alp well may be correct that Scott and his men were not forced to go onto short rations, neither could they draw upon what should have been excess rations.It is striking the revised date and location of the onset of Evans\u2019 scurvy was shifted south of where the supplies apparently went missing. Perhaps this is a coincidence? Perhaps not. Regardless, I consider the evidence that Evans did take food beyond his fair share to be compelling. Whether it would have made a difference to the survival of the Polar Party is something we will probably never know.  It is a great shame that the value of the new research findings reported in the article are not recognized by Mr Alp.\n\nI, therefore, maintain that the new documents and analyses raise serious concerns over the actions of Lieutenant Evans [14-. It seems unlikely the above will be the end of the story and I look forward to future research into what I hope will be the release of source material not currently available to researchers.   \n\n=References=\n\n[1] Beaumont, L. (1913). Letter to Lord Curzon, 17 April 1913. London: British Library Mss.Eur.F112/51. \n\n[2] Bowers, H. (2012). The South Pole Journals. Cambridge: Scott Polar Research Institute.\n\n[3] Cherry-Garrard, A. (1922). The Worst Journey in the World. London (Republished 2003): Pimlico.\n\n[4] Curzon, G. N. (1913). Notes, 16 April 1913. London: British Library BL MSS EUR/F112/51. \n\n[5] Ellis, A. R. (1969). Under Scott's Command: Lashly's Antarctic Diaries. New York: Taplinger Publishing Company.\n\n[6] Gran, T. (1961). Kampen om Sydpolen. Oslo, Norway: Ernst G. Mortensen.\n\n[7] Gran, T. (1974). Fra Tjuagutt til Sydpolfarer. Oslo, Norway: Ernst G. Mortensen.\n\n[8] Hattersley-Smith, G., & McGhie, E. J. (1984). The Norwegian with Scott: Tyggve Gran's Antarctic Diary 1910-1913. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office.\n\n[9] Markham, C. (1913). Letter to Lord Curzon, 12 February 1913. London: British Library BL MSS EUR/F112/51. \n\n[10] Scott, R. F. (1912). Letter to Joseph Kinsey, 24 March 1912. Sydney: Mitchell Library MLMSS 5599.\n\n[11] Scott, R. F. (1913). Scott's Last Expedition London: Smith, Elder & Co.\n\n[12] Simpson, G. C. (1923). Meteorology Vol. III: Tables (British Antarctic Expedition 1910-1913). London: Harrison and Sons, Ltd.\n\n[13] Stroud, M. (2004). Survival of the Fittest: Anatomy of Peak Physical Performance. London: Vintage.\n\n[14] Turney, C. (2012). 1912: The Year The World Discovered Antarctica. Melbourne: Text Publishing.\n\n[15] Turney, C. S. M. (2017). Why didn't they ask Evans? Polar Record, 53(5), 498-511. \n\n[16] Turney, C. S. M. (2018). Why didn't they ask Evans? A response to Karen May. Polar Record, 54, 178-180. \n\n[17] Wilson, E. (1972). Diary of the Terra Nova Expedition to the Antarctic 1910-1912. New York: Humanities Press."
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            "9": {
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                "title": "Simple Arithmetic Proof that Captain Robert F. Scott\u2019s Party did not Perish in 1912 due to Weather and Starvation",
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                        "*": "\nKrzysztof Sienicki\n\nChair of Theoretical Physics of Naturally Intelligent Systems, Topolowa 19, 05-807 Podkowa Le\u015bna, Poland, EU.\n\n\nCaptain Robert F. Scott\u2019s Antarctic expeditions, like any human undertakings which have exploratory aspects - even recent ones - were bound to run into many different troubles and difficult times. Both of Captain Scott\u2019s expeditions, but especially the Terra Nova Expedition [1] of 1910-1913 (British Antarctic Expedition 1910-1913), were life-threatening bold endeavors. They were highly complex logistical undertakings where humans, animals, machines, and nature played their roles.[2] In some respects, Captain Scott\u2019s methods were archaic, but in other respects, they were innovative and ahead of their time.[3] Ever since the Terra Nova Expedition\u2019s ship returned with the news from Antarctica in 1913, a great number of causes for the disaster have been offered, proposed, and widely discussed. However, it was Captain Scott himself in his Message to the Public [4] who first presented a number of reasons for not being able to return to home base at the Ross Island (Hut Point/Cape Evans). The list of causes of the Captain Scott party\u2019s disaster - both referred to by himself and later by various authors - is rather long. However, it is assumed that the final cause of the Captain Scott party\u2019s deaths was slow starvation. [5] Here, we show a simple arithmetic proof that Captain Scott\u2019s party, which consisted of himself, Dr. Wilson, and Lt Bowers, had full food/fuel rations until at least Mar. 27th, 1912. The result seriously and principally questions Captain Scott\u2019s integrity in reporting actual causes of the party\u2019s deaths back in late March 1912.<br/>\nCaptain Scott\u2019s Terra Nova [6] and Captain Amundsen\u2019s Fram [7] expeditions were definite events, which during the planning and executing stages were reduced to numbers: miles per day, calories per day, temperature, efficiency, work, friction, etc. Both explorers and the members of their expeditions, in different degrees of proficiency and expertise, transformed these numbers into everyday life and actions. Although Captain Scott\u2019s South Pole Journey was primarily a logistic undertaking, the fundamental aspects of it were neglected by historians, biographers, and hagiographers. Only a few specialized exceptions exist, scattered in professional journals. The majority of books concentrate on the nostalgic lamenting over the suffering of Captain Scott and his companions. Authors close their eyes to scientific analysis while arguing that Captain Scott\u2019s expedition was a primarily scientific expedition. \n\nApparently, before going South in 1910, Captain Scott presented to the Royal Geographical Society a lecture in which he suggested that the ideal date to reach the Pole [8] would be Dec. 22nd. Since the account of the Nimrod Expedition (1907-1909) was already published, Captain Scott could figure that if he would follow Lt Shackleton\u2019s route to the Pole, he would have to cross about 1345+97<math>\\times2</math>=1539 geographical miles in say <math>2\\times52\\times\\left[30+22\\right] days=104 days</math>[9], starting on Nov. 1st. It would mean that the velocity of the traveling party must be 16.3 miles per day, every day, for 104 days! A staggering figure. No contingency plan. No delays, no blizzards, and no rest. How Captain Scott was expecting to reach the Pole on such an early date without dog sledging transportation will remain a mystery.\n[[File:Fig.1.png|thumb|right|800px|Figure 1.|Figure 1. Food/fuel dep\u00f4ts available to the First Return, Second Return and Captain Scott parties along the route: five men sledging to the Pole was Captain Scott\u2019s actual logistics. The actual food allotted to each party is denoted by 3-tuple {First, Second, Scott} parties. Food rations are given in integers or fractions of my own units (1 of my units = full food/fuel allowance for 4 men for one week (7 days) time). The following abbreviations have been used: 1TD (One Ton Dep\u00f4t), MB (Middle Barrier Dep\u00f4t), LB (Lower Barrier Dep\u00f4t), LG (Lower Glacier Dep\u00f4t), MG (Middle Glacier Dep\u00f4t), UG (Upper Glacier Dep\u00f4t), 3o (Three Degree (3o) Dep\u00f4t), NN (No Name Dep\u00f4t), <math>1\\frac{1}{2}o(88o29\u2032S Dep\u00f4t)</math>, and SP (South Pole). A very awkward splitting food/fuel rations for returning parties at MG Dep\u00f4t <math>\\left\\{ \\frac{5}{3},\\frac{9}{20}\\left(\\sim\\frac{1}{2}\\right),\\sim\\frac{3}{4}\\right\\}</math> resulted from an unequal splitting of the distance up (or down) the Beardmore Glacier.]]\n\nIt appears that a detailed and final logistic plan concerning time, rations (food and fuel), distances, people and traveling means, was in place in early September 1911. One could only wonder what was so time-consuming for Captain Scott to figure out the Southern Journey rations and distances distribution along the route to the South Pole. Thus, a sledging journey, a 144-day window of opportunity, to reach and return from the South Pole was envisioned by Captain Scott. The key to this plan was the sustained sledging velocity, which was about 10.1 geographical miles per sledging day. In modern terms, the sustained sledging velocity can be understood as a long-term average of a stochastic process, in which the daily sledging distance was a bound stochastic variable. In terms of the initial distribution of food and fuel rations, Captain Scott\u2019s plan of the Southern Journey was straightforward and followed the 144-day sledging schedule. It can be divided into two stages: the Barrier stage, and the beyond the Barrier (the Beardmore and Plateau) stage. This division was not only a geographical one. It was, more importantly, the division resulting from Captain Scott\u2019s overall mobility due to dog/pony/man sledging velocity, and the related potential possibility of food and fuel re-supplying party/dep\u00f4ts along the route at the Barrier stage. Once the parties started to ascend the Beardmore, they were beyond recall and on their own. From the foot of the Beardmore Glacier, the initial rations of food and fuel were only diminishing. The distribution of food/fuel rations is presented in Fig. 1.\n\nIt is evident that the returning Captain Scott party of five men (himself, Dr Wilson, Captain Oates, Lt Bowers and P. O. Evans) started each returning leg between dep\u00f4ts with the allocated maximum of food/fuel rations to support the party until the next dep\u00f4t was reached. Thus, upon reaching Lower Glacier Dep\u00f4t on Feb. 18th, 1912, the party collected 1\u00bc sledging unit, altogether 35 daily rations for 5 men. However, a day before this, P. O. Evans died. Consequently, the food/fuel rations allotted to him were not consumed. The four man party continued sledging. On Mar. 17th, 1912 Captain Oates committed suicide. As a result, food/fuel rations originally allotted to him were not consumed. Now, it is evident how one could calculate actual food/fuel rations available to the Captain Scott party. The outcome of these simple arithmetical calculations is depicted in Fig. 2. It is the main result of this paper.\n\nAlthough the conclusions from an examination of Fig. 2 are rather palpable, the following comments seem to be pertinent. This figure is indeed an illustrative one. If the party was sledging as a five man party as originally assumed, it would be out of food/fuel on Mar. 16th. However, due to the death of P.O. Evans on Feb. 17th the party was a four man party, and thus every sledging day one ration originally meant to be consumed by P.O. Evans was \u201csaved\u201d and later consumed by those who were alive. The full food/fuel rations for a party of four would end on Mar. 25th. In reality, Captain Oates perished on Mar. 17th and one more time, extra rations were \u201csaved\u201d. The party of three, Captain Scott, Dr Wilson, and Lt Bowers could sledge on full rations until Mar. 27th, 1912. This simple arithmetical result contradicts what is known from Captain Scott\u2019s account in his diary. It questions Captain Scott\u2019s entry on Mar. 19th that \"\\ldotsWe have two days' food but barely a day's fuel.\" In reality on this day (see Fig. 2), the party of three (Scott, Wilson, and Bowers) had eight (8) days of full food/fuel rations. It completely undermines Captain Scott's account on Mar. 22th and 23rd that \"\\ldots no fuel and only one or two of food left \\ldots\". As the deaths of P. O. Evans and later Captain Oates were unexpected sources of food/fuel for these alive, the role of ponies, according to Captain Scott's as an additional food supply for returning parties remains a mystery. From the onset Captain Scott, by not taking pony food for their return leg, was tacitly assuming that the ponies would be shot somewhere before the entrance to the Beardmore Glacier. Since eating pony meat was not a taboo, as, in the case of dog meat, one obviously must consider the addition of pony cutlets into the returning parties' menu.\n[[File:Fig.12.png|thumb|right|800px|Figure 2.|Figure 2. The number of daily sledging rations available to Captain Scott\u2019s five-man party (\u25cb: Scott, Wilson, Bowers, Oates and Evans), four man party (\u25cf and \u25bc: Scott, Wilson, Bowers and Oates) and three man party ({<math>\\color{red}\\bigstar</math>}: Scott, Wilson and Bowers) party, respectively. The triangles \u25bc represent a hypothetical situation in which Captain Oates did not perish.]]\nUpon arriving at Shambles Camp/Lower Glacier Dep\u00f4t, something extraordinary happened. The Captain Scott party, in addition to the full food/fuel10 rations dep\u00f4ted along the return route, found an abundance of food - pony cutlets stored in December 1911. The presence of pony cutlets at Shambles Camp was obviously not surprising. What is startling is that Captain Scott and his party, casually and bordering on negligence, did not take all of the pony cutlets. Although Captain Scott on Feb. 18th clearly acknowledged \"plenty of horsemeat\" at Shambles Camp, in the following days he took relatively little advantage of pony cutlets. We do not know the exact numbers or how many pounds of cutlets were obtained from the ponies. However, using a conservative estimation11, one can figure that these cutlets alone would have been sufficient to feed the Captain Scott party until One Ton Dep\u00f4t was reached. The weight of a pony varies from 400-800 lb, and if about <math>\\frac{1}{10}</math> of this pony mass was transferred into pony cutlets, it would give 4080 lb from one pony. Since five ponies were shot at Shambles Camp, this yields 200-400 lb of cutlets. If one person was daily consuming 2 lb of these cutlets, then the pony meat dep\u00f4ted at Shambles Camp would have been sufficient for (200\u2013400)/2 = 100\u2013200 days for one man. And because Captain Scott sledged from this camp in a 4-man team, it would translate into 25-50 sledging days. Taking a middle value of this estimation, one must conclude that the pony cutlets from Shambles Camp could have fully supported Captain Scott\u2019s party food intake for well over a month of sledging. Yet Captain Scott only refers to eating pony meat from Feb. 18th through Feb. 28th. Since the distance from Shambles Camp to Hut Point is about 349 miles, the pony cutlets would have been sufficient to feed the party all the way back. In a similar fashion, the distance between Shambles Camp and One Ton Dep\u00f4t is 231 miles; Captain Scott\u2019s party could have easily reached it sledging exclusively on rations of pony cutlets. Provided that the first pony (Jehu) was shot on Nov. 24th, 1911 and that this location was reached by the returning Captain Scott party on Mar. 3rd/4th, 1912, the possibility of reaching One Ton Dep\u00f4t and feeding on pony cutlets becomes a certainty. Let me stress here that the above is valid without the party\u2019s use of food originally dep\u00f4ted on the Barrier. None of the above happened, and Captain Scott\u2019s party made very little of the pony cutlets. In summary, it was shown that due to deaths of P. O. Evans and Captain Oates, the remaining party of four and later three (Scott, Wilson, and Bowers) had full food/fuel rations to Mar. 27th, 1912.12 This finding and almost entire neglect of pony cutlets during the return leg extend a list of deceits reported by Captain Scott in late February and March 1912. A more extensive examination of the above and many additional issues is presented in the author book titled Captain Scott: Icy Deceits and Untold Realities.[2] \n\nReferences\n\n[1] Robert F. Scott, Scott\u2019s Last Expedition: Being the Journals of Captain R. F. Scott, R. N., C. V. O., Vol. I, Dodd, Mead & Company, The University Press, Cambridge, USA.\n\n[2] Krzysztof Sienicki, Captain Scott: Icy Deceits and Untold Realities, Open Academic Press, Berlin-Warsaw, 2016.\n\n[3] Ibid.\n\n[4] Robert F. Scott, Scott\u2019s Last Expedition: Being the Journals of Captain R. F. Scott, R. N., C. V. O., Vol. I, Dodd, Mead & Company, The University Press, Cambridge, USA, cf. p. 414.\n\n[5] Colin Martin, Scientists to the End, Nature 481(2012)264; Roald Amundsen, My Life as an Explorer, Doubleday, Page and Company, Garden City, 1927, cf. p. 71. \n\n[6] Robert F. Scott, Scott\u2019s Last Expedition: Being the Journals of Captain R. F. Scott, R. N., C. V. O., Vol. I, Dodd, Mead & Company, The University Press, Cambridge, USA.\n\n[7] Roald Amundsen, The South Pole: An Account of the Norwegian Antarctic Expedition in the \u201cFram\u201d 1910\u20131912, John Murray, London, 1912.\n\n[8] Robert F. Scott, Scott\u2019s Last Expedition: Being the Journals of Captain R.F. Scott, R.N., C.V.O., Vol. I, Dodd, Mead & Company, The University Press, Cambridge, USA, 1913, cf. p. 376; Robert F. Scott, Plans of the British Antarctic Expedition, 1910, The Geographical Journal 36(1910)11\u201320, cf. p. 16.\n\n[9] Nov. 1st through Dec. 22nd .\n\n[10] Provided some <math>\\frac{1}{10}</math> less fuel due to tin leakage. For calculations see Krzysztof Sienicki, Captain Scott: Icy Deceits and Untold Realities, Open Academic Press, Berlin-Warsaw, 2016, cf. section 9.3, p. 345-365. \n\n[11] Krzysztof Sienicki, Captain Scott: Icy Deceits and Untold Realities, Open Academic Press, Berlin-Warsaw, 2016, cf. section 9.4, p. 365-376.\n\n[12] Krzysztof Sienicki, A Note on Several Meteorological Topics Related to Polar Regions, The Issues of Polar Meteorology 21(2011)39\u201376."
                    }
                ]
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}